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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

IMPROVEMENT OF COMBAT TRAINING QUALITY URGED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN [People's Army Review] in Vietnamese No 10, Oct 79 pp 19-27, 38

[Article by Major General Cao Van Khanh: "Improve the Quality of Combat Training"]

[Text] Our people's armed forces are facing a new historic mission and, along with the entire population, are determined to smash the aggressive plots and acts of Chinese expansionism and negermonism, strongly defend the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of our socialist Vietnamese homeland, and defend our people's socialist revolution, while fulfilling their international obligation to Laos and Kampuchea.

The basic and urgent goal of combat training is to contribute as positively and greatly as possible to improving the quality and developing the combat strength of the people's armed forces, in order to assure that they can, along with the entire population, fulfill the historic missions mentioned above. If that is to be accomplished, combat training must truly create a new development and transformation with regard to training contents, curricula, organization, and methods, and meet correctly and promptly the very great requirements and developments regarding combat missions, military art, organization, and technical equipment of the people's armed forces in war to defend the homeland.

The improvement of the quality of the combat training of our people's armed forces depends on many factors. But the most decisive factor is that combat training must adhere closely to the party's military line and missions, and fulfill the mission and requirements which our people's armed forces must carry out victoriously in war to defend the homeland. That factor has a very deep effect on the determination of training contents and curricula, as well as the directions and measures for improving and perfecting organization and training methods in the new situation.

The people's armed forces are the hard-core forces of the entire population in carrying out armed struggle. In war to defend the homeland, armed struggle plays the main role in the various forms of struggle, a role which determines the development process of the battlefield situation. The operational

objective of the armed forces have also changed: it is now the Chinese aggressor army, the effective tool of Beijing big-nation expansionists, who are now allying closely with the U.S. imperialists. The military strategy, strategic objectives, and armed struggle of people's war to defend the homeland has undergone new developments in comparison to the liberation war. Furthermore, our people's armed forces are much larger and stronger than ever. The degree of ferocity, complexity, and modernity of armed struggle has increased. All of those developments with regard to armed struggle in war to defend the homeland must be reflected correctly, fully, and in a lively manner in the combat training of our people's armed forces.

In view of the requirements of the new situation and missions, combat training is one of the decisive factors with regard to strengthening the combat strength of our people's armed forces, and to assuring that the three types of troops, the armed forces branches, and the combat arms always maintain a high degree of combat readiness and fight victoriously.

Along those lines, with regard to combat training it must be clearly understood that training and combat are one in the same, and that it is necessary to closely combine training with combat readiness and combat, and give practical training in the things required by war to defend the homeland. It is necessary to make all-out efforts at all places and at all times to create all necessary conditions for promoting, and improving the quality of, professional training in the armed forces branches and combat arms, so that they may attain a new, solid, all-round, and uniform level, to both meet the requirements of the immediate combat and combat-readiness missions and create conditions so that our people's armed forces will increasingly raise their level of professionalism, modernity, and eliteness.

1. Training according to the combat missions of the people's armed forces, the combat groups, the combat arms, and the armed forces branches in war to defend the homeland.

In comparison to the war of liberation in the past, in the war to defend the homeland against Chinese expansionism, the people's armed forces must, along with the entire population, strongly defend the territorial integrity of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam--an independent, sovereign country with a full-fledged governmental, economic, social and cultural structure and in full possession of its wealth and natural resources. Therefore, the main-force troops, the local troops, and the militia and self-defense forces all have the mission of annihilating the aggressor troops and rapidly smashing the aggressive attacks as soon as they are launched, on the spot where the enemy first set foot on our territory, in order to strongly defend the land, skies, and seas of the homeland, protect the lives and property of the people, defend the nation's economic bases, and defend our people's enterprise of building socialism. The above combat missions have posed new requirements for combat training.

One of those new requirements is training the main-force troops, the local troops, the militia and self-defense forces, and even the on-the-spot combat

forces and mobile combat forces, so that they will be able to counterattack, attack, and take the defensive skillfully, and to closely combine counterattacks and attacks with the defensive on the tactical and campaign scales and on the various kinds of topography. That will assure that our people's armed forces can strike annihilating blows, annihilate large enemy forces, strongly defend the land, skies, and seas of the homeland, defend the lives and property of the people, and defend the nation's economic bases. Strong defense, resolute counterattacks and attacks, with counterattacks and attacks being the principal focus and the defensive being especially important, are new developments in the employment of tactical forms in war to defend the homeland. That development reflects the subjective requirements of the enterprise of defending the homeland: promptly stopping the aggressive attacks of the enemy troops, annihilating much of the enemy manpower, defending the strategic areas, strongly defending our forces in all ways, resolutely counterattacking and attacking to completely annihilate the enemy troops, and completely smashing their aggressive attacks. Therefore, the armed forces must be trained to closely combine counterattacks, attacks, and the defensive even in the same direction and same area of operations, as well as in directions and areas of operation which are different but are closely related.

Viewed more deeply training must be closely attuned to the missions of each category of troops and each armed forces branch and combat arm, in order to give training in the campaign formations, the tactical formations, the principles and scales of force utilization, operational principles, combat techniques, etc., in order to fulfill the combat missions of each type of troops, each armed force, and each combat arm in war to defend the homeland. In contrast to liberation war, one of the very basic requirements is training each category of troops, each armed force, and each combat arm so that they can enter into battle and fight victoriously from the very beginning, on many different scales of force utilization, including large scale, under fierce, complicated combat conditions, even during the very first days of the war. That is an essential requirement of armed struggle under the modern conditions of war to defend the homeland.

With regards to the units, combat groups, armed forces branches, and combat arms that have been assigned combat missions in specific areas of operation, training according to combat mission must be carried out even more resolutely, strictly, and specifically. That is one of the principal missions of training at the present time, and is intended to assure that our people's armed forces will have a high degree of combat readiness and promptly smash the aggressive attacks of the Beijing reactionaries anywhere in our country and at any time. The important matter is that those units and combat groups must regard training according to combat mission as one of the principal contents of combat readiness and one of the basic measures for assuring combat readiness. On that basis, we must resolutely set aside time, forces, and facilities to train cadres and enlisted men to firmly grasp the concepts of fighting the enemy, the tactical forms and combat stratagems, the combat techniques, and the basic maneuvers in the combat conditions that may occur with the specific enemies which the unit must fight, on the terrain on which the unit operates.

Training according to combat missions in those units and combat groups requires the strict attainment of training norms, training times, and standards, for evaluating the training with regard to goal attainment, etc., in order to attain high training quality and avoid the phenomenon of training in accordance with combat mission without meeting the combat requirements.

2. Train our people's armed forces to defeat the new operational objectives.

Our people's armed forces are now facing a new operational objective: the Chinese aggressor army. That aggressive, counterrevolutionary army has specific strengths and weaknesses which differ from those of the aggressor armies of the French colonialists and U.S. imperialists. Although they share much in common with all aggressor armies, but they also have their own operational laws. With regard to organization, equipment, tactics, combat stratagems, and morale, they in many specific ways differ from the expeditionary armies which our army defeated.

Therefore, the training of our people's armed forces must be appropriate to the actual, objective requirements in order to defeat the new enemy. The recent combat experiences in the northern border region must be fully utilized in order to train the cadres and enlisted men, and the armed forces branches and combat arms, so that they may be sufficiently skilled to limit the strengths, and exacerbate the weaknesses of the Chinese aggressor army. We must develop the recent experiences of combat against large numbers of enemy troops, train our army in basic, effective operational methods, and bankrupt the enemy's "human wave" strategy. We must study the combat forms and stratagems in order to train the units and combat groups to defeat continual attacks by large forces as well as the enemy's deep penetrations and secret approaches. We must train the main-force troops, local troops, and militia and self-defense forces in operation principles that are resolute, positive, flexible, and brave, in order to strike at the enemy troops' weaknesses, key positions, and openings.

We must fully, meticulously, and specifically study each of the enemy's technical subjects in order to train our cadres and men in higher-level techniques in order to defeat the enemy's technical measures and annihilate them. The tactics, combat schemes, and techniques which the enemy has not yet revealed, such as bombing, air attacks, airborne assaults, chemical attacks, amphibious landings, and the use of chemical and nuclear weapons, must also be carefully researched in order to train the various types of troops, the armed forces branches, and the combat arms in effective methods to cope with them.

Training that is appropriate to the new operational objective must be manifested not only in the training contents but also in training organizations and methods. We must organize research groups to specialize in the Chinese aggressor army, which study specific political-ideological, organizational, equipment, weapons, military art, rear services, technical, and other topics, and the changes that are made, in order to derive their operational laws. On that basis, we must determine basic, comprehensive, and specific measures for counterattacking, attacking, and annihilating them on the battlefield. In war games, as well as in arranging drill fields, we must go all-out to represent the enemy as "realistically" as possible, so that the cadres and

men can truly defeat them. We must go all-out to avoid the phenomenon of the enemy being presented one way in training materials and programs but presented another way on the drill field. That easily leads to a subjective tendency of regarding the enemy lightly, and of oversimplification and superficiality when studying the enemy in order to defeat them.

3. Train our people's armed forces to fully exploit their new capability, and to fight the enemy with the greatest strength from the very beginning and from the first battles, as well as during the war's developmental process.

In contrast to liberation war, in war to defend the homeland our people's armed forces had already been created and strongly developed before the war broke out. In fact, the main-force troops, the local troops, and the militia and self-defense forces now have new capabilities with regard to combat strength. Those capabilities are manifested in the political quality of the cadres and enlisted men, in the constant improvement and changing of weapons and technical equipment, in their modern military art, in the system of material-technical and rear-services support, in the organization of forces, etc. The new combat strength of the people's armed forces is also greatly increased when the various categories of troops, the armed forces branches, and the combat arms are in the defensive systems which are being built all over the nation and in each locality.

On the basis of the requirements of the enterprise of defending the homeland, to the maximum possible extent we must resolutely train each category of troops, each armed force, and each combat arm to be able to fight the enemy with their greatest strength immediately after war breaks out. When organizing forces and units at a certain echelon--company, battalion, regiment, division, or corps--there must be a capability for fighting the enemy with all the strength of that echelon. The detachments, troops, and units of the armed forces branches and combat arms must be trained to become truly expert in the tactical formations, the combat schemes, techniques, and command, so that they can participate in the fighting during the very first days of war to defend the homeland, in the areas assigned them, with strength and organized forces.

Training must be concentrated on improving the ability to use and maintain weapons and technical equipment, especially modern weapons and technical equipment, of the three categories of troops, the main-force troops, and the local troops.

To train the various kinds of troops, the armed forces branches, and the combat arms to exploit their new capabilities with regard to weapons and technical equipment is to train the cadres and men to expertly use and maintain the various kinds of weapons and technical equipment assigned to their units. With regard to the schools and institutes, that training must be carried out systematically, fundamentally, and comprehensively on the basis of raising the level of modern military science and technology. In the various units, it is necessary to combine basic, all-round training with training in the techniques of using and maintaining the various kinds of weapons and equipment in their table of organization, while also conducting

training to improve basic skills in compulsory programs. Cadres and men must be trained to truly master the weapons and technical equipment, to use the weapons and technical equipment in correct accordance with their capabilities and intended use, and fully develop their effectiveness, and in accordance with our fighting methods and our country's terrain and weather conditions.

We must provide high-level quality for the technical cadres and personnel and the cadres heading sectors in the technical subjects regarding artillery, missiles, tanks, anti-aircraft artillery, radar, warships, aircraft, military engineering, communications, etc. There must be plans for greatly increasing the number of such cadres and personnel to serve as the hard core in using and maintaining weapons and technical equipment, create a large replacement force and, at the same time, promote the long-range modernization of our army.

In the process of professional and modern development, our armed forces are developing both quantitatively and qualitatively. The components of the armed forces branches and combat arms are gradually maturing and growing in strength in all respects. Therefore, there must be training to assure that those forces are able to develop great strength on the battlefield, by the operational formula of coordinating the armed forces branches and combat arms. The various types of troops, the armed forces branches, and the combat arms must be trained to coordinate skillfully as soon as the enemy troops begin the war, on different kinds of terrain, with different combat arms coordinating on the scales, even on a large-scale. The units, groups, and combat arms must be skilled in coordinated fighting when counter-attacking, attacking, and on the defensive, on the mainland as well as in the sky and at sea.

In war to defend the homeland, the main-force troops, the local troops, the militia and self-defense forces, the armed forces branches, and the combat arms must fight the aggressor army on battlefields that have been prepared in advance in each locality and in the nation as a whole. Such battlefield positions consist of systems of combat villages, factories, construction sites, and state farms, combat clusters, and district, provincial and municipal military fortresses, with the deployment of a full complement of combat forces and combat service forces, a network of battlefield positions, a road network, a command network, and a rear-service and technical support network. Therefore, the main-force troops must be trained to coordinate in combat with the local troops and the militia and self-defense forces, while the mobile main-force units and the combat arms must be trained in coordinated fighting with the on-the-spot forces of the local soldiers and people on those battlefields. The on-the-spot forces and the combat forces of the militia and self-defense units must be trained so that they can be capable of coordinating with the main-force units and with the mobile main-force groups in the various operational modes, on both the tactical and campaign scales. That will assure that our people's armed forces in each strategic area and in each village, district, province, and municipality will fight the enemy with the greatest possible strength.

4. Training in tactics. The cadres in all regards become more and more of a task of training.

First of all, we must train and cultivate the cadres at the various echelons so that they can grasp and successfully apply the military line, viewpoint, thought, and mission of the party in war to defend the homeland. That is one of the decisive factors enabling our people's armed forces to fight and develop in accordance with the laws of people's war to defend the homeland under modern conditions. The basic requirement is to enable the cadres to have correct and profound knowledge of the new contents and requirements which our party has set forth in the objectives and nature of war to defend the homeland, in evaluating the comparison of forces between ourselves and the enemy, in the strategic motives and intentions, in the war-fighting formulas, etc.

On that basis, the cadres must be trained and cultivated to fight, strike and victoriously resolve the basic problems of armed struggle and of the task of building the army. In accordance with the missions and requirements our party has posed for armed struggle and for the armed forces in that war.

In the time to come, it is necessary to concentrate training on improving the cadres' organizational and command abilities. Actualities has demonstrated that the new developments of the war to defend the homeland, as well as our army's rapid development in all respects urgently demand that we must improve the abilities of the command cadres of the various categories of troops at all echelons and in all respects. The schools and institutes have very great responsibility in that mission. A new developmental step must be taken with regard to the cadres' organizational and command abilities. The detachment command cadres must be trained to skillfully utilize the tactical forms and combat stratagems of their echelon, by the greatest strength of the detachment under all circumstances and on all kinds of terrain. The cadres commanding troops at the combat troop, armed forces branch, or combat arm level must be trained in organizing coordinated combat of the armed forces branches and combat arms on all scales, especially on medium and large scales and on the various kinds of terrain, for the counterattacks, attacks, and defensive actions, and with regard to both tactics and campaigns. Especially, they must be able to skillfully command combined arms combat under the most fierce and most complicated circumstances, especially on the front line and during the time course of the war. Attention must be paid to training cadres to carry out organization and command in accordance with their missions and responsibilities, according to official contents, and in a professional manner.

The cadres commanding and leading the local military task must be cultivated and trained so that they may be capable of assisting the party committees guiding the movement of all people to fight the enemy to a very high level of development in each locality, and be capable of organizing and commanding large battles and campaigns of local people's war in the provincial and municipal areas of operation. We must bring about a true transformation with regard to ability to grasp and apply the tactical art and operational formulas of local people's war in order to defend the homeland.

The actualities of our army's development and combat demand that training must improve the all-round unit management of the cadres at the various echelons, especially with regard to the management of the unit's weapons, equipment, and modern material-technical bases. The cadres themselves must firmly grasp the function, principles, regulations, and techniques of managing weapons and equipment so that they can carry out that task well and oversee the lower echelons. We must resolutely oppose the phenomenon caused by a lack of knowledge or a lack of a sense of responsibility. We must concentrate training on enabling cadres to be able to manage, and teach discipline in, the unit. Every cadre must be able to manage and educate the lower echelon, in accordance with their function and with the regulations and orders. We must resolutely maintain discipline in combat, training, daily activities, and work, and maintain the weapons in the unit in correct accordance with the regulations of the army and the laws of the state.

In addition to training command cadres, we must pay attention to training cadres to work in staff, political, and rear service organs. We must concentrate on professional training for those cadres in accordance with systematic, basic requirements, and on forging work styles that are planned, are highly accurate, and are highly practical. They must be trained to be fully capable of serving as cadres in the command organs of a revolutionary, professional, modern army, in people's war to defend the homeland.

In training cadres, we must resolutely fulfill the requirement of training the cadres at the various echelons systematically, basically, and comprehensively, and equip the cadres with modern military knowledge, ability to organize scientifically and professionally, and a work style that is accurate, meticulous, and specific, with the upper echelon teaching the lower echelon and giving practical, effective assistance to the lower echelon.

5. Train the reserve forces well.

In order to defeat the Chinese aggressor army, which is numerically large, we must have elite, experienced, professional, and modern regular forces, but must also have powerful reserve forces which are prepared, tightly managed, and well trained. That is an objective requirement of the fierce fight against a large, very barbarous enemy army.

In order to promptly, correctly, and adequately supplement the regular forces, we must carry out training of reserve forces on a vast scale, systematically, basically, comprehensively, and uniformly. The objects of the training are not only the officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted men who have served in the armed forces and are now working and producing in the state organs and in the localities, but also include some of the militia and self-defense cadres and enlisted men. The training contents and curricula, as well as the organization of training, of those forces must clearly adhere to the combat missions and the organization table, equipment, and facilities of the regular forces, of the armed forces branches and combat arms. Training must be organized so that the armed

forces branches, such as the infantry, the air force, the army, and the air-defense forces, and such combat arms as artillery, tanks, missiles, anti-aircraft artillery, communications, military engineering, radar, etc., have powerful, complete reserve forces. First of all, we must concentrate on training command cadres, technical cadres, and technical personnel. The armed forces branches and combat arms, create a plentiful supplemental and replacement force, and assure that the armed forces branches and combat arms can fight continuously.

That training mission is carried out principally by the local military organs at the various echelons, under the unified guidance of the Ministry of Defense. However, each armed forces branch and combat arm must positively assist the localities, the industrial zones, and the colleges and specialized secondary schools to determine training curricula and materials, and provide instructors and training facilities. The actual situation demands that the contents of reserve force training be improved. Training organization must be improved on a large scale, and management and guidance must be unified. The training of reserve forces must be formalized and completely systematized, and be professional and solid with regard to contents, organization, time, and management organs, as well as the policies and regulations regarding the instructors and students, training expenditures, etc. Only thereby can we get the training of reserve forces onto the right track on a vast scale, and meet the army's combat and development requirements in war to defend the homeland.

6. Continually perfecting training organization and improving training methods is a basic measure for improving training quality.

The basic requirement is to create a system of professional, basic, and all-round training that is appropriate to the mission of increasing the combat strength of the people's armed forces in war to defend the homeland.

First of all, the schools and institutes must perfect the organization of basic and advanced training for officers at the various echelons. In order to train a corps of cadres (including command cadres, staff cadres, cadres doing party and political work, rear services and technical cadres, etc.) with sufficient ability to organize command and leadership and to manage the units well, it is necessary to urgently supplement and improve the training contents and curricula so that they can be appropriate to the missions of the people's armed forces in war to defend the homeland. In the immediate future, it is necessary to resolutely train cadres professionally and basically, in accordance with unified contents, curricula, and standards. And at the same time, in each force, armed forces branch, and combat arm must urgently perfect training organization so that it becomes increasingly uniform and attains high quality with regard to the tactical and specialized technical levels of the command cadres and specialized technical cadres.

In addition to improving the organization and command abilities of the command cadres and organs at the various echelons in the regular forces,

it is necessary to pay attention to studying and organizing and training cadres to command the local military work in accordance with a professional curricula which is suitable to the requirements of local people's war in war to defend the homeland.

The struggle direction for improving the quality of our combat training at the present time is to make comprehensive, uniform, and solid. Therefore, in training it is necessary not only to pay attention to training and supplementing command cadres and organs at the various echelons but also to doing a good job of rectifying the training of noncommissioned officers, basic-level technical personnel, and new recruits in the military regions, the corps, and the provincial and municipal military commands. Those training organizations must adhere closely to the requirements of the units and the combat missions in order to improve and supplement the training contents so that they may be appropriate. At the same time, it is necessary to concentrate on the highest quality training in basic matters regarding techniques, tactics, and regulations, in accordance with a unified curricula.

In order to promptly meet the requirements of the training mission and improve the quality of professional training, we must urgently promulgate training orders and regulations and strictly enforce them. With regard to the units and combat-readiness missions at the front, training must be organized very tightly and flexibly. Those units must closely combine the training of cadres with the training of troops and must hold combined maneuvers by the command cadres, the command organs, and the troops. The requirement regarding the organization of training in those units is to assure both high-quality training and a high degree of combat readiness.

In order to continually improve the quality of combat training, we must positively improve the training methods along the lines of developing modern military teaching methods and employing increasingly improved training methods. All concerned, from the organs organizing and guiding training to the schools and units, must boldly utilize such scientific subjects as psychology, communications, model-making, automation, etc., in accordance with proletarian pedagogical viewpoints, in order to develop modern military pedagogical methods for our armed forces. We must study the rational combination of the various subjects; provide the material bases for training, and develop facilities and study aids in order to increase realism by means of models and maps; organize and create tactical maneuver areas and regular rifle ranges; upgrade the methods of teaching by means of many different facilities and implements, etc. All of those things are intended to teach the training contents accurately and fully in the shortest period of time, and enable the cadres and men to assimilate the training contents rapidly and solidly, with regard to both theory and action.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

IMPORTANCE OF GOOD MAINTENANCE STRESSED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN [People's Army Review] in Vietnamese No 10, Oct 79 pp 39-45

[Article by Nguyen Xuan: "Do a Good Job of Maintaining Our Army's Weapons and Equipment"]

[Text] Good maintenance of weapons and all technical equipment is an important mission in increasing the combat strength of our people's armed forces. Only if we store and maintain rifles and grenades well can we avoid, when trouble occurs, the situation of weapons jamming, ammunition being wet, grenades failing to explode, etc., which would weaken the troops' combat strength. It is even more important to do a good job of storing and maintaining such modern equipment as jet aircraft, the various kinds of artillery and missiles, and the observation, reconnaissance, measurement, communications, radar and other facilities, for only then can we exploit their technical and tactical capabilities and their effectiveness in combat. The effects of the poor storage and maintenance of such equipment may result in instances of airplanes not being able to take off, of missiles and artillery shells not going off, not being accurate, or even causing accidents, of optical equipment becoming clouded and mildewing, of electrical equipment becoming inaccurate, etc., and not meeting the requirements of combat-readiness and combat. Therefore, the units' fighting capabilities will be greatly reduced.

The good maintenance of weapons and all technical equipment also has a very great economic significance. The cost of manufacturing the weapons and technical military equipment is usually very great in comparison to other production-economic costs. By way of comparison, the cost of equipping a 57 mm antiaircraft artillery company is equal to the capital invested in 12 cattle-raising state farms, each with 1,000 cows, or equal to the cost of equipping a small factory, plus the value of its production for a year. Therefore, if we do a good job of storage and maintenance; keep the damage caused by nature to a minimum; prevent damage by the enemy; and prolong the period of use of weapons and technical equipment, we can economize on money, on technical materials, and on the large technical workers and cadre forces used in repairing equipment and in producing new equipment to replace or

supplement existing equipment. According to statistics published in foreign publications, every dollar expended in maintaining weapons and equipment saves five or six dollars in repair and production expenses.

Therefore, the maintenance of weapons and technical equipment has very great military and economic significance. It is even more important with regard to armies equipped with many modern weapons and technical facilities, for such equipment has good technical and tactical effectiveness, are very lethal and serve to support large-scale fighting. They are also technical facilities which are sophisticated, expensive, and difficult to manufacture. Therefore, at present the armies of many nations pay much attention to maintaining weapons and technical equipment.

Our army is a revolutionary army, a people's army which is supported by the people and fights for the people. Our cadres and men, exploiting that basic quality, have emphasized using the enemy's weapons to kill the enemy and endeavored to train to use with high effectiveness the weapons and technical facilities in their possession, to realize the slogan "one enemy soldier for each bullet." Our cadres and men have also paid attention to managing their weapons and equipment with a spirit of "regarding weapons as wives and bullets as children" and "loving vehicles as if they were children and treasuring gasoline as if it were blood." They have paid attention to maintaining the various kinds of equipment and combat facilities well and to using them for long periods of time, in order to increase the units' combat capability and reduce defense expenditures, thus reducing the people's contributions.

In the anti-U.S. resistance war, some of our airplanes were used by our pilots to shoot down dozens of modern U.S. jets, but were still in good condition. In 1972, our armored troops were able to prolong the use time of dozens of tanks, and thus were able to save hundreds of thousands of dong. Some truck drivers travelled 160,000 kilometers safely without their trucks having to be overhauled, which was four times the recommended distance. We also maintained, and studied prolonging the use time of, a number of other weapons and combat facilities. Such good examples have entered the combat life of our army and have become a fine tradition that we must continually develop.

Our people now have the mission of maintaining a high state of combat readiness and continually assuring that there are sufficient forces, capabilities, and strength to stop and defeat all aggressive acts of adventurism of the Beijing expansionists and hegemonists, and strongly defend the homeland. Our armed forces' technical equipment is far different from that of the past. With the weapons and war facilities they possessed after the total victory of the spring of 1975, with the material-technical assistance of the Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist nations, and with the accomplishments in the enterprise of building the material-technical bases of socialism throughout the nation during the past several years and in coming years, our armed forces have a complete system of weapons and technical equipment, of which the modern component accounts for a large and

growing ratio. One of the most noteworthy characteristics of such modern weapons and technical equipment is that their level of design and manufacture in many ways surpasses our country's present economic and industrial capabilities. Therefore, rational, economical, and highly effective use and good long-range maintenance to assure that the existing technical equipment will not be downgraded for a long time and that their period of usage will be prolonged have truly great national defense and economic significance for us. That is also a very practical way to assure that our armed forces always have a stockpile of technical military equipment, for the present and for a certain period in the future, in order to meet the requirements of combat readiness and combat as well as the requirement of developing forces in a manner appropriate to the situation, capabilities, and advance of the national economy. Therefore, whether at the front or in the rear, whether in a large unit or a small unit, or whether in warehouses and workshops or in combat units, we must do a truly good job of storing and maintaining weapons and technical equipment.

The basic requirement of the task of maintaining weapons and technical equipment is to store all types of aircraft, guns, and ammunition, and the various kinds of combat facilities and military equipment in the armed forces in such a manner as to avoid humidity and mildew, rust, loss of quality or accuracy, dirt, and damage, thus assuring that they will not be degraded for a long time, that their useful life will be prolonged, that they will not be stolen or damaged and, when there is fighting, they may rapidly be brought into use with the highest possible quality.

In accordance with the above requirements, the storage and maintenance of weapons and technical equipment are usually carried out with the following principal contents:

Understanding the characteristics of the technical equipment, specifically: grasping the past history, permissible hours of usage and time of usage, maintenance procedures, and maintenance cycle of each type of weapon, combat facility, etc.

Maintaining the quality of the technical equipment, specifically: cleaning it inside and out, according to the stipulations regarding each type of gun, ammunition, and combat equipment at each echelon, in each combat arm, and in each operational condition. It must be disassembled, packaged, and stored so that it can be stockpiled and assembled, fuel can be pumped, crates and cans opened, and weapons and ammunition readied, in order to achieve a state of readiness in accordance with the various combat alert levels and to use them in accordance with the various kinds of combat activities. There must be regular inspections, error adjustment and technical calibration, lubrication, and supplementation of parts and materials, for the equipment, and the necessary repairs must be made on damaged equipment.

Limiting the effect of nature on technical equipment and assuring that weapons and equipment do not become rusted, corroded, or mildewed.

Protecting, and not allowing the enemy to capture or destroy, the weapons and technical equipment.

In our army, in addition to the weapons, ammunition, and combat facilities that have been supplied to the units, there are stockpiles at the various echelons and supplementary supplies which are in the pipeline. Those that have been supplied to the units are essentially to be used directly by the troops in combat, training, drills, and guarding. The stockpiles are intended to replace and supplement the unit's supplies, meet the needs of the organizational development of the armed forces, and meet the increasingly greater requirements of combat-readiness and combat. Therefore, those that are always in the troops' possession must be used daily, while there are some kinds which are stored in warehouses and are only used monthly, annually, or every few years. Therefore, the requirements and detailed contents of storage and maintenance at each echelon and in each unit and component differ in various ways. The storage and maintenance of weapons and equipment in warehouses differ from those in units; they differ according to whether the unit is at the front or in the rear; and they differ according to whether the weapons and equipment are in the hands of the troops or are being transported. The important matter is that all echelons, units, and components must meet the basic requirements of storing and maintaining weapons and equipment.

In the units in a state of combat-readiness, storage and maintenance are carried out in the very process of using the weapons and technical equipment, in order to assure the victorious fulfillment of the daily operational and training plans. Therefore, the most essential tasks are positioning and concealing the facilities to achieve secrecy and safety; preventing the weapons, equipment, and ammunition on the battlefields from becoming excessively exposed to sun, rain, and dirt; rationally organizing the disassembly, assembly, cleaning, and lubricating of guns and artillery pieces; opening crates and cans and preparing ammunition; preparing plans to store and maintain weapons and technical equipment under all circumstances, etc.

In the ordnance warehouses and depots at the various echelons, especially at the campaign and strategic levels, the attainment of requirements and contents of storage and maintenance is intended principally to assure that the stipulated stockpile of supplies is always available and is of high quality. Therefore, it is necessary to cleverly position warehouses and depots, and to arrange, shelter, package, store, and protect the stockpiled weapons, ammunition, and equipment so that they will not have to be downgraded and will not be captured or destroyed by the enemy, and to facilitate withdrawing them to promptly replace or supplement the units' supplies.

Assuring that weapons and technical equipment retain their quality and will not have to be downgraded for a long time is always a foremost concern

of the campaign and strategic supply depots. That system of depots--especially the strategic depots--usually contain a large percentage of the army's stockpiles of weapons and equipment. Therefore, in the process of fulfilling the ordinary requirements regarding maintenance it is necessary to institute professional maintenance and, on the basis of the actual situation, study the organization of a maintenance "assembly line," extend the maintenance cycle, apply the maintenance techniques, carry out maintenance according to season, etc., to achieve maximum efficiency and be appropriate to our armed forces and our nation. Since our army is still being strengthened with regard to technical military equipment, an essential task at present is to seek all ways to do a good job of maintaining and storing the new equipment so that it will not deteriorate, while at the same time prolonging the life of the existing equipment and "cannibalizing," restoring, and repairing the damaged equipment.

Natural conditions are always a major problem which govern the process of fulfilling the requirements and contents of storing and maintaining weapons and technical equipment. Our country is a hot, humid tropical country with much rain and weather which varies from area to area and season to season. In the mountains-and-jungle region the climate is usually humid. Along the coast and on sea islands there are always strong winds, sand, and salt-water mist. Such natural characteristics cause weapons and military equipment--from items made of iron and steel to optical equipment and items made of plastic and rubber--to rust, cloud over, mildew, or deteriorate, and deteriorate rapidly and in large numbers. Thus whether in the large depots of the upper echelon or in the small warehouses and depots of the lower echelons, and whether the weapons, ammunition, or equipment are in storage, are being transported, or have been supplied to the troops, it is very essential to do a good job of implementing the organizational regulations and measures and the technical measures in order to prevent and limit the harmful effects of the environment, weather, and climate.

Due to its nature, significance, requirements, and contents, the task of maintaining weapons and technical equipment can attain good results only because of the extensive activities and contributions of the components of the armed forces. Those activities and contributions are realized by both organizational-administrative measures and technical measures.

With regard to organization and administration, it is necessary to create a maintenance organizational structure made up of material-technical forces and facilities, especially in the technical combat arms and armed forces branches, which is appropriate to the army's technical development and technical maintenance requirements. It is necessary to create and cultivate a corps of technical cadres and personnel, such as drivers, repairmen, maintenance personnel, and warehouse keepers. We must assure managerial unity when carrying out a division of labor in, and a decentralization of, maintenance, and carry out regular maintenance and medium and large repairs on guns, artillery pieces, vehicles, and machinery. We must rationally arrange a system of warehouses and workshops, and do a good job of organizing stockpiling and distribution. It is necessary to strengthen training, raise

the troops' level of understanding of science and technology and of military science, and guide the various categories of troops in firmly grasping the requirements and contents of maintenance at their echelon. We must correctly fulfill the missions and responsibilities of each sector and echelon, do a good job of enforcing the regulations and systems, and step up inspection and supervision in order to further maintenance activities in all three types of troops.

The mission and responsibility of the commander are manifested in a concentrated manner in educating, organizing, supervising, and inspecting the troops, so that they may do a good job of fulfilling the tasks, regulations, and systems regarding storage and maintenance, and in creating conditions for the comrades engaged in specialized work to enter deeply into the techniques of storage and maintenance, so that they may be appropriate to the operational conditions of the unit and of the army. The mission and responsibility of each person or of each three-man team are essentially the good fulfillment of tasks, regulations, and systems; no matter what, they must maintain and protect the weapons and equipment so that they will not become damaged or lost, or fall into the hands of the enemy. As regards the technical cadres and personnel and the comrades in charge of maintenance, their most important mission and responsibility is to study and recommend technical measures for carrying out maintenance and manufacturing maintenance materials, establish regulations and standards regarding maintenance, guiding the troops in their maintenance activities, effectively help the commanders carry out maintenance, and do a good job of maintenance in their own spheres.

Fulfilling one's responsibility and carrying out a division of labor and decentralization also means that with regard to all good points and deficiencies in storing and maintaining weapons and equipment it is necessary to determine the responsibilities of individuals, units, echelons, organizations and sectors. We must avoid the situation of depending on one another, and therefore not knowing whether or not weapons and ammunition have been lost or whether they are in good condition or are damaged, or what individual or component is ultimately available. If there are accomplishments in fulfilling missions and responsibilities there must be praise and awards, and when mistakes are made there must be punishment. The individuals and units which do a good job must not be treated the same as individuals and units which do a poor job, so that good points are not developed and deficiencies are ignored.

All units, echelons, and components must observe the regulations and systems regarding the storage and maintenance of weapons, ammunition, and equipment. There are regulations and systems regarding the disassembly, assembly, and cleaning of guns and artillery pieces, the preparation of ammunition, etc., in the units. There are regulations and systems regarding arrangement, packaging, "mothballing," humidity-prevention, rust-prevention, fire-prevention, etc., in the warehouses and depots. There are regulations and systems regarding registration, categorization, inspection, reporting, etc. In the warehouses and workshops there are usually stable conditions for observing the regulations and systems regarding storage and maintenance. But if there is a lack of strictness, accuracy, and meticulousness it is possible that warehouses may burn down, ammunition may explode, weapons may become damaged, and injuries may be inflicted, thus resulting in major

losses. The units at the front, due to the fact that they must always be in a high state of combat readiness, experience more difficulties than those in other places. However, they still must not neglect the minimum requirements and contents of the regulations and systems. Our troops operating on the northern border proved that even under the most tense combat-readiness situation and in fighting the Chinese aggressor army it was still necessary and possible to observe the regulations regarding the storage and maintenance of weapons and military equipment. The greatest difficulty is not that there are no conditions for implementing those regulations and systems, but that all units must implement them strictly, make them a regular practice, and implement them creatively and in a manner appropriate to their specific activities. Of course, the upper echelon must set requirements, give guidance to and create all necessary conditions for the units, and provide the units with the minimum materials and equipment necessary for storage and maintenance.

The application of technical measures in maintenance is very necessary and is indispensable. Those measures are:

Improving the maintenance environment by making the warehouses well ventilated, cool, and in correct accordance with specifications, and equipping them with equipment to counter humidity, fire, and rust. Using crates, cans, and packaging of wood, metal, plastic, or paper that has been asphalted or coated with paraffin, in order to protect the equipment and prevent exposure to water.

Preventing contact with the environment in order to prevent the rusting and corrosion of metal by plating, bluing, lubricating, etc., and thus creating a protective coating on the outside of weapons and equipment.

Seeing to it that weapons and equipment are always dry, clean, and not exposed to humidity and dampness, and countering fungus mildew, and rot by using dehumidifying materials, chemicals, radiation, etc.

With regard to maintenance techniques, at present there are some problems, such as countering the rusting and corrosion of metal, which have become the common problems of many countries of the world. Since our country's climate is humid, it is even more important to counter rust, corrosion, mold, mildew, and rot. Therefore, in addition to applying the existing technical measures we must study the manufacture of maintenance materials and facilities and decide upon maintenance procedures that are appropriate to tropical conditions. The results of the application of such technical measures above all depend on the responsibility, knowledge, and working methods of the comrades doing technical work and of the forces specializing in maintenance in the armed forces.

With regard to our cadres and men in the units, the technical measures are in some ways simpler. However, with regard to effectively deploying and equipping the field depots and ordnance depots, to storing and transporting crates and packages safely and in a way that avoids puncturing and breaking,

to preserving the layers of paint, plating, and bluing on weapons and equipment, to keeping weapons and equipment dry and clean, to disassembling, assembling, cleaning, and changing oil and grease in accordance with regulations, etc., our cadres and men must fully realize the technical demands and do a good job of implementing the technical systems and rules. They must also use weapons and equipment safely and in correct accordance with their capabilities and the technical regulations if they are to be used for a long time before breaking down or deteriorating.

Therefore, it is necessary to continually improve the quality of military training and the cadres' and men's knowledge of essential scientific-technical subjects. It is necessary to mobilize and organize the masses to come forth with initiatives and improve techniques in order to do a good job of using and maintaining weapons and equipment. Education and training in military subjects and in military science and technology must assure that the troops master their weapons and equipment, that they both use them expertly and know how to maintain them well and use them a long time, and that they know how to inspect them and carry out ordinary maintenance and repair. In addition to raising the military and scientific-technical levels, forging a strict, accurate, and meticulous work style in technical activities is also a requirement and measure that cannot be lightly regarded.

All of the above measures have an effect. But no one measure in itself can bring about real results. Therefore, we must widely apply and closely combine those measures so that they can assist and supplement one another. The decisive matter is still, by means of education, creating and developing a spirit of mastery, consciousness of responsibility, and self-enlightenment on the part of the cadres and men. If that is lacking, then all organizational-administrative and technical measures will be limited. Under the leadership of the party committees in the army, with full understanding of the military and economic benefits, and the requirements and contents, of the maintenance task, and by means of strict and persistent education and the good application of organizational and technical measures, it is certain that we will assure that weapons and equipment are well maintained and long-lasting, and contribute in a real way to increasing the combat strength of our armed forces.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

FURTHER STRENGTHENING OF ARMORED FORCES URGED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN [People's Army Review] in Vietnamese No 10, Oct 79 pp 28-38

[Article by Major General Dao Huy Vu: "The Armored Troops in War to Defend the Homeland"]

[Text] Under the ever-victorious flag of the glorious Vietnam Communist Party, the armored troops have during the past 20 years, developed while fighting challenging battles, sacrificing, and achieving brilliant feats of arms. The armored troops, with the direct leadership and education of the party and the all-out respect and assistance of the people, the armed forces branches, and combat arms, have "matured rapidly and made outstanding progress" and have victoriously fulfilled all missions.

In the war against the U.S. for national salvation, the armored troops, always manifesting a spirit of "Nothing is more precious than independence and freedom," fought very bravely, resolutely, resourcefully, and creatively, created the tradition of "winning every battle," were worthy of being praised as being "a young combat arm that has achieved many feats of arms," and had the honor of bearing the appellation of "Heroic Armored Combat Arm." In the fighting against the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists and their lackeys, the armored troops were determined to fight and win, and contributed worthily to, along with the other armed forces branches and combat arms, and the people, to annihilating and smashing Beijing's lackey aggressor army in Kampuchea, strongly defending the homeland's southwestern border, and creating favorable conditions for the true revolutionary forces of Kampuchea to arise and overthrow the bloody ruling yoke of the genocidal Pol Pot-Ieng Sary gang.

Today, the armored troops are, along with our entire army and population, endeavoring to defend our socialist Vietnamese homeland and oppose the plots and acts of the Beijing reactionaries, who seek to invade and annex our country. That glorious historical mission is posing for the armored troops new, very great requirements with regard to both development and combat. The armored combat arm, manifesting a glorious tradition and applying its precious combat experiences, is determined to further increase its combat strength, fully develop their assault, firepower, and mobility strengths and,

along with the other armed forces branches and combat arms, victoriously fulfill its missions in war to defend the homeland.

People's war to defend the socialist Vietnamese homeland against the war of aggression of the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists set forth new contents and requirements regarding the roles and missions of the armed forces branches and combat arms in armed struggle in general and the role and mission of the armored troops in particular.

As every one knows, in our country the armored troops are an important assault force of the infantry and, along with the infantry, form our army's principal assault force on the ground. That basic role and mission till retain their value in war to defend the socialist homeland, but there have been new developments regarding contents and requirements in comparison to the anti-U.S. war in the past. Those developments reflect the new requirements of war to defend the homeland as well as the new capabilities and strengths of the armored troops themselves.

First of all, the armored combat arm must fully exploit its assault force, firepower, and mobility and, along with the infantry, create the strongest, greatest assault force in order to coordinate closely with the armed forces branches and combat arms to stop and rapidly smash the aggressive attacks of the Beijing expansionists as soon as they are launched, as soon as they set foot on our territory. That is an objective requirement of the enterprise of defending the socialist homeland. In order to defend the independence and sovereignty of the homeland, strongly defend our land, skies, and seas, protect the lives and property of the people, and protect the nation's economic installations, the armored forces must, along with the armed forces branches and combat arms, strike the aggressor troop with powerful blows as soon as they set foot on the beloved soil of our homeland. The armored combat arm today is fully capable of fulfilling that requirement. The armored combat arm has come of age with regard to morale, will, technique, tactics, and material-technical bases, has improved equipment and facilities, and has continually perfected with regard to its structure and organization. With a combat strength that has been developed and prepared in advance, when war breaks out the armored troops are fully capable of developing their assault strength, firepower, and mobility during the very first days of the war, on the battlefields on which they have been assigned missions.

In the liberation war, the armored troops developed from a small scale to a large scale and were able to play the role of an important assault force on the ground in the most important campaigns. In the war to defend the homeland, the reverse is true. The armored combat arm must develop to the highest degree its assault strength, firepower, and mobility beginning in the very first phase of the war, and contribute to, along with the armed forces branches and combat arms, winning complete victory in the war. That is also an operational principle of the armored troops in war to defend the homeland.

In contrast to the liberation war, in war to defend the homeland the armored troops must strongly develop their role as an important assault force of the army in counterattacks and attacks, and even when on the defensive. That requirement reflects the new development of the combat mission and the new developments in the operational situation of our armed forces in war to defend the homeland.

In comparison to the liberation war, our army's counterattacks and attacks during war to defend the homeland are usually very fierce, strong, and continuous, with increasingly greater strength, even during the period immediately after the enemy begins an aggressive war against our country.

Therefore, the armored troops must make very strong efforts to fully develop their assault strength, firepower, and mobility in order to effectively assist the armed forces branches and combat arms in victoriously carrying out counterattacks and attacks, and in annihilating large, important segments of the enemy forces during the very first period of the war and rapidly smash their aggressive attacks. When they are assigned a defensive mission, the armored troops must fully utilize their superiorities regarding armor, firepower, and mobility in order to increase the solidity and positiveness of the defensive troops, while at the same time developing their assault strength, firepower, and mobility in order to, along with the other forces, counterattack fiercely and promptly annihilate the enemy troops. The role of the armored troops on the defensive is a new development of military art in war to defend the homeland. Therefore, we must study the correct and creative development of the armored troops' role in that operational form.

With their function as a component of the main-force forces of each battlefield and of the mobile main-force groups in war to defend the homeland, the armored troops may also play the role of the principal assault force in each direction, on each battlefield, and in each campaign and battle. That is also an objective development of the armed struggle in modern people's war.

With strong assault force, great firepower, and a high degree of mobility, the armored troops are capable of rapidly and promptly meeting the requirements of moving forces, strengthening the assault force, and increasing the rate of advance under the most arduous and fierce combat conditions, especially under unforeseen conditions. Under those circumstances, the armored troops are responsible for victoriously fulfilling the combat and campaign missions principally by means of their own forces, in coordination with a number of other forces, especially with the infantry or mechanized infantry, artillery, anti-aircraft, and military engineer components, etc. The armored units may become the principal assault force when they fulfill the mission of forces sent in advance to attack and take important objectives, of forces which surround the enemy troops or circle around to attack them from behind during campaigns, of mobile reserve forces which launch counterattacks and attacks when on the defensive, of mobile forces which attack enemy troops who land by air or sea, etc. Therefore, the armored troops must continually perfect their operational organization and art.

In order to fully develop the role of the armored troops in war to defend the homeland, it is necessary to study the correct, creative resolution of the following problems regarding operational art:

1. Resolutely utilizing the armored forces in a concentrated manner, fighting the enemy from a position of strength, attacking the enemy unexpectedly, and attaining high effectiveness.

In order to create strong assault strength with which to overwhelm the enemy troops, it is essential that we use tanks and armored vehicles in a concentrated manner, in order to create superior forces and firepower in the important areas and at the decisive times, against an enemy with large numbers of troops. If they are used in a piecemeal, dispersed manner, the armored troops will not have sufficient forces to create strong assault strength and they may be gradually worn down by the enemy troops in the course of the fighting. In the liberation war, our army usually fought the enemy by attacking selected objectives. Therefore, we could easily use our tank and armored forces in a concentrated manner against a few offensive objectives. In war to defend the homeland, especially during the initial period, armed struggle occurs on a vast area, in many different directions, on many different kinds of terrain, and under fierce, complicated conditions. That situation demands that the commanders have good skills and concentrate the tank and armored vehicle forces on the principal objectives and in the principal missions at the decisive times.

Modern combat, with modern reconnaissance, command and communications facilities, sets forth the requirement of attacking the enemy unexpectedly in order to rapidly overcome the resistance of the enemy troops. The armored troops, with their high degree of mobility, can move rapidly, concentrate and disperse in a flexible manner, and take advantage of the terrain to conceal their formations and positions, in order to launch overwhelming surprise attacks against the enemy. It should not be thought that tanks and armored vehicles cannot by themselves maintain and exploit the element of surprise. The actualities of the recent victories demonstrated that tanks and armored vehicles can create the element of surprise. The more we take advantage of the element of surprise in attacking the enemy, the more strongly we can develop the assault force, firepower, and mobility of the tanks and armored vehicles; even in small numbers, they can still create strength that overwhelms the enemy. Therefore, we must resourcefully take many steps to maintain secrecy, deceive the enemy, and conceal ourselves, in order to create the element of surprise; we must surprise the enemy with regard to the places where we use tanks and armored vehicles, when we use them, and what numbers and types of vehicles we use.

Fighting the enemy with high effectiveness is an objective requirement since we must fight and defeat an enemy, who are numerous and have much technical equipment, in modern war, with its great attrition of manpower and technical equipment. Fighting the enemy with high effectiveness is also a basic measure which allows the armored troops to become increasingly stronger as they fight and to continually develop their forces in the process of war. That requirement demands that the armored troops be elite and have advanced operational

art so that they can annihilate many of the enemy while protecting their own forces. The requirement of fighting the enemy with high effectiveness is in complete opposition to the concepts of using tanks against tanks and armored vehicles to "intimidate" the enemy. Therefore, we must study the effective use of each unit and each tank and armored vehicle, and closely coordinate the combat activities of the tanks with those of the infantry, the artillery, the air-defense forces, the tank-defense forces, the anti-tank missile forces, the military engineers, etc., in order to annihilate many enemy tanks and infantry while we use a relatively small number of tanks and armored vehicles.

2. Skilled combat coordination between the armored troops and the other armed forces branches and combat arms, especially the infantry, on all scales.

The armored troops and the infantry are very closely related and combine to form our army's principal assault force on the ground. In modern combat, the assault force, firepower, and mobility of the armored troops can be developed fully and strongly only when they coordinate with the infantry. Infantry and armor are the principal forces used in fulfilling the combat and campaign missions on the ground: annihilating the enemy, defending territory, protecting the people, and protecting the economic installations. Of course, the infantry and armor must coordinate closely with the artillery, the military engineers, the air-defense forces, the air force, the navy, etc. Therefore, close coordination in combat between the infantry and the other armed forces branches and combat arms is a basic, universal operational formula of the armored troops in war to defend the homeland.

First of all, the armored troops may coordinate in combat with the infantry and with the armed services branches and combat arms in the operational formula of mobile main-force combat groups. In that operational formula, the armored units and groups are either placed in army corps made up of many combat arms or operate as independent combat groups which can fulfill such missions as launching attacks and counterattacks in the principal direction, serving as "boomerang," tactical envelopment, or campaign forces, serving as upper-echelon mobile reserve forces; serving as forces sent in advance or utilized in defense, etc. In order to fulfill those missions, the armored troops must be skilled in coordinating with the infantry and the other combat arms and armed forces branches on a vast area, on many different kinds of terrain, and in many directions, all at the same time. In the process of coordinating, the armor troops must develop their assault force, firepower, and mobility to the maximum, and operate harmoniously with the infantry and the armed forces branches and combat arms to rapidly annihilate the enemy troops' principal formations and solidly defend the zones assigned them.

The armored troops may also coordinate with the infantry and the other forces in the operational formula of local people's war. They may coordinate with the main-force troops of the districts, provinces, and municipalities, with the main-force battle groups of the military regions, and with the

militia and self-defense forces on a medium or large scale, in the important areas and directions. The coordinated combat of the armored troops in local people's war occurs after attacks have been prepared in advance in the combat villages, in the factories and state farms, at construction sites, in the combat clusters, in the district military fortresses, and in the strategic provincial and municipal units. The armored troops must study creative, flexible combat operations in that battlefield situation, in order to exploit their assault force, firepower, and mobility, give effective support, and create advantageous conditions for the local armed forces and the on-the-spot forces to develop their combat strength. The scale on which the armored forces are utilized in local people's war depends on many factors, but we must go all-out to avoid using them in a dispersed, piecemeal manner, for if we do so we cannot exploit the strength of the armored troops and they therefore cannot give effective support.

The armored troops must coordinate expertly in the various tactical and campaign forms and in the operational modes. War to defend the homeland requires the armored troops to coordinate skillfully in such tactical and campaign forms as counterattacks, attacks, and the defensive, and in the operational modes of fighting enemy troops landed from the air or the sea, etc. In counterattacking and attacking, it is necessary to resourcefully create a dense concentration of tanks and armored vehicles, in close combination with the infantry, and to coordinate harmoniously with the other combat arms in order to create superior combat strength, counterattack and attack strongly and continuously and absolutely and fully fulfill all of the missions that are assigned. When on the defensive, it is necessary to both fulfill the mission of strengthening the battlefield positions and the defensive strong points, and fulfill the function of sharp, prompt counterattacking of forces, in order to contribute to holding and restoring the battlefield positions and annihilating the enemy troops. It is necessary to fully utilize superior mobility and step up the rate of advance in order to suddenly appear and, along with the other forces, rapidly smash the enemy's landings by air and sea in our strategic rear area.

War to defend the homeland demands that the armored troops coordinate their combat skillfully on medium and large scales during the very first days of the war. When launching a war of aggression, the enemy usually uses large, elite forces with modern weapons and technical equipment, and utilizes the wildest and foolhardiest operational measures even during the very first days, in hopes of rapidly crushing the opposition and quickly concluding the war to their advantage. In order to defeat the adventuristic aggressive attacks, and bankrupt the nefarious strategic plans, of the Beijing reactionaries, our armed forces must immediately reply by launching counterattacks and attacks with the greatest possible strength, or stop the enemy by very stubborn defensive actions, and then launch counterattacks and attacks in order to annihilate them. Therefore, the scale of coordinated combat during that period may be small, medium, or large, especially medium or large, with tanks and armored vehicles being used in appropriate numbers. If that is to be accomplished, it is necessary to do a truly good job of resolving the problem of command, flexibly utilize the operational forms and stratagems,

and organize specific coordination between the tanks and armored vehicles and the other combat arms, give material-technical support, etc., for only thereby can we create advantageous conditions for the armored troops to quickly enter the battle on an appropriate scale under fierce and complicated circumstances.

3. Have skilled and continually improving ability to fight independently, and perfect the unit's tactical forms, combat stratagems, and operational formulas.

As stated above, the tanks, armored vehicles, and self-propelled artillery must, depending on the specific conditions, play the role of the principal assault force in carrying out the combat and campaign missions. Furthermore, due to their development and maturization the armored troops have increasingly become a combat force which directly annihilates the enemy, protects the people, and defends the economic installations.

Due to the requirements of their combat missions, the armored troops have increasingly become combined arms troops. Therefore, when studying the combat arm's fighting methods it is necessary to study comprehensively and specifically the combat activities of tanks, armored vehicles, self-propelled artillery, mechanized infantry, artillery, anti-aircraft artillery, and even such support forces as the combat engineer, communications, anti-chemical warfare, and other forces, so that they may coordinate harmoniously and fully develop their assault force, firepower, and mobility in battles and campaigns.

The armored troops themselves must be skilled in employing the tactical and campaign forms, in counterattacking and attacking and, when necessary, in the methods of fighting enemy troops who land by air or sea, and in the stratagems of surrounding, interdicting, circling around behind, and ambushing, the enemy. The tactical and campaign forms, and those combat stratagems, must be employed with the highest effectiveness on the various types of terrain--in the mountains, and jungles and along the coast--and, after the war has expanded,--in the piedmont region, the lowlands, and the cities, under fierce and complicated combat conditions. A very important matter is that, no matter what the tactical or campaign form the armored troops must fight the enemy with the greatest possible strength and with elite skills, in order to attain high combat effectiveness. Relying on numbers, armor, firepower, and steel treads to fight clamorously or to "intimidate" the enemy must be severely criticized.

In war to defend the homeland, the combat and campaign circumstances on the battlefield change very rapidly and in a complicated manner. The enemy often change their operational stratagems. The combat missions of the armed forces branches and combat arms are continually developing. Therefore, in order to utilize the independent combat mode with a high degree of efficiency, the armored troops must continue to creatively develop their tactics and combat stratagems so that they may be appropriate, and create and perfect the art of using tanks, armored vehicles, and self propelled

artillery on our country's battlefields. It is very necessary to actively study and correctly resolve the new problems regarding the tactics, campaigns, and fighting techniques of that combat arm, so that it may be appropriate to our army's modern operational art in war to defend the homeland. At the same time, we must very skillfully and promptly assimilate and develop the new matters regarding tactics, campaigns, and combat techniques which arise in the process of war.

4. Fight continuously, over a long period of time, with great material-technical consumption.

In order to continually attack and counterattack, or defend stubbornly and strongly, to stop the enemy and annihilate large numbers of them, the armored troops must be skilled in fighting continuously. In the liberation war, the armored troops participated in the fighting on selected battlefields in a number of specific areas. In war to defend the homeland, the area of operations of our army in general, and that of the armored troops particularly, are very large. Battles and campaigns succeed one another on increasingly larger scales and with increasingly greater intensity, even during the initial phase of the war, on the homeland's front line. The armored troops, an important assault force, must operate in accordance with those objective requirements.

In order to fight continuously over a long period of time, the armored troops must maintain a spirit of constant offense and of persistent fighting, know how to create a favorable position and great strength, and maintain that position and strength in the combat process. We must do a good job of supporting their continuous activity with regard to command, rear services, and technical facilities.

Creating a strong position and maintaining forces in the process of battles and campaigns are complicated problems with regard to combat organization and command. The armored command cadres must plan and calculate the truly rational use of forces in order to have direct-combat forces with strong assault force and have strong reserve forces. Utilizing the tactical forms and combat stratagems with high combat effectiveness is a basic measure for maintaining combat strength over a long period of time. It is also necessary to do a good job of supplementing the armored troops with manpower and equipment, promptly restore their strength and position, and make good preparations for the succeeding battles, especially the decisive battles. Only by positively taking full advantage of the favorable conditions of the battlefield positions deployed in advance in each district, province, and municipality, and in each strategic direction, can we do a good job of maintaining the armored troops' ability to engage in continuous combat.

With regard to the armor combat arm, a modern technical combat arm, continuous combat demands the good resolution of the problem of rear services and technical support, especially technical support. It is necessary to pay attention first of all to fuel, ammunition, and the repair of technical equipment, and to assuring mobility. At the same time, it is necessary to assure the road

and communications network. That support correspond to the scale and nature of modern combat, which is usually large-scale and covers a large area, with great material, technical, weapons, and ammunition consumption. We must gradually professionalize and modernize technical support, and assure the armored troops' rear services support, which has become an essential requirement of modern warfare. The commanders of armored and combined arms units are directly responsible for supervising the support plans and the regulations regarding utilization, thus enabling prompt and complete supplying which is appropriate to continuous, long-term fighting.

That development of operational art in war to defend the homeland poses new requirements for the construction of the armor combat arm, in order to fully develop the assault force, firepower, and mobility of the tank and armored vehicle forces on the battlefield.

The basic guideline for developing the armored troops is that they must fulfill their role and combat missions in the various operational formulas of people's war to defend the homeland, and rapidly build an increasingly professional, modern, and elite combat arm in order to be worthy of being, along with the infantry, the principal assault force on the battlefield.

1. In the present situation, the armor combat arm must, first of all, have a high degree of combat readiness.

The armored units, especially the units that have been assigned missions in specific areas of operation and directions, must prepare good combat plans, prepare forces and promptly deploy them, prepare mobility routes and assure mobility, and meticulously prepare material-technical and rear services support. The troops, command cadres, and command cadres must be trained to operate expertly, in accordance with combat plans, in order to enter the fighting quickly with the greatest possible strength. The mobile armored units must study and prepare in accordance with the combat missions in directions and on battlefields planned in advance, thus assuring that when they receive orders they can promptly enter the fighting on a large scale.

We must take the initiative in coordinating with the relevant forces on the battlefield in each district, province, and municipality in order to, along with those forces, unify operational plans, organize and prepare roads, material, rear services, command, etc., and improve the combat readiness of the armor combat arms.

While fulfilling their combat-readiness missions, the tank and armored vehicle units must strictly observe the systems and regulations regarding combat alerts, training, and daily activities, with consistently high quality. The cadres at the various echelons must have a strong sense of responsibility, and have a deep, meticulous, and specific work style in order to firmly grasp the troops' situation, help the lower echelon overcome difficulties, and raise the unit's level of combat readiness. The units must strictly enforce the regulations regarding patrolling and reconnaissance to grasp the enemy's situation and the other relevant situations, regarding reporting and the request of instructions, etc. When so ordered, the

armored troops must be able to enter the fighting immediately, and absolutely must not be passive or be taken by surprise.

2. War to defend the homeland requires that the armored troops urgently build a combat arm that is increasingly professional, modern, and elite.

Only thereby can the armored troops have a basis for developing their assault force, firepower, and mobility to meet the requirements of modern combat in war to defend the homeland.

First of all, the armored troops must attain a high degree of unity in thought and action on the battlefield. To attain that goal, it is necessary to concentrate the guidance and leadership of the units and combat groups on studying and strictly enforcing the combat and training regulations and the work systems, and on maintaining weapons and technical equipment. It is necessary to closely combine the fulfillment of the combat-readiness missions with the drafting, editing, and promulgation of combat orders, statutes, and work systems.

It is very necessary at present to rapidly raise the level of the leadership and command organizations. The organization of the combat units and groups, and the organization of support units, must be very streamlined and of high quality. First of all, it is necessary to develop and perfect the organization of the armored units and groups at the various echelons, and in a number of combat arms and armed forces branches in a unified and uniform manner, thus assuring that those units and groups do a good job of fulfilling the functions and missions of their echelon in the various operational modes, both in local people's war and in the operational modes of the mobile main-force units. On the basis of the existing capabilities and the developmental direction of the combat arm, it is necessary to continually perfect and improve the weapons and technical equipment of the combat arm along the lines of increasing modernization and uniformity regarding combat facilities, command facilities, mobility support facilities, and technical repair facilities.

3. A very important and urgent mission at present is good training to continually increase the combat arm's combat strength.

In training the combat arm, it is necessary to fully understand and creatively apply the revolutionary lines and missions and the military lines and missions of the Party. In order to fight well in the present phase it is necessary to resolutely carry out systematic, basic, unified, and comprehensive training. Training must be integrally related to the requirements of the immediate and long-range missions of the combat arm, and closely combined with combat readiness and combat.

It is necessary to conduct good combined arms training among the combat arms and armed forces branches, in formations made up of many combat arms; at the same time, it is necessary to pay attention to training the combat arm in independent operations. At present, because the requirements of combat are developing, training the cadres and enlisted men of the armor combat arm to

use the various kinds of tanks, armored vehicles, self-propelled artillery, anti-aircraft weapons, and modern mobility facilities has a very great significance; it fully develops the capabilities, effect, and force of the various kinds of modern weapons and facilities, and limits damage, loss, and destruction caused by deficient command and utilization.

Cadre training is an extremely important part of the training task. The units and schools in the combat arm must train the corps of cadres to firmly grasp the revolutionary lines and missions and the military missions and military science of the Party, the modes of armed struggle, operational art, and combat organization and command of the armor combat arm. At the same time, it is necessary to raise the level of management of material-technical bases. The cadres must have sufficient knowledge to lead and command the units in outstandingly fulfilling all missions in people's war to defend the homeland.

In order to do a good job of guiding the training task and continually improve the quality of training throughout the combat arm, it is necessary to pay attention to further promoting the work of the schools and to positively care for, cultivate, educate, and train a strong and well-rounded corps of instructors and workers. Experience shows that it is necessary to closely combine in-school study with study in the unit, with emphasis on study in the unit; but we absolutely must not regard lightly basic study in regular schools and classes.

4. An extremely important mission in order to maintain and continually increase the combat strength of the armor combat arm is creating a basic network of material-technical support to serve the combat requirements, for combined arms combat among the combat arms and armed forces branches on an increasingly larger scale consumes very large quantities of weapons, ammunition, fuel, replacement parts, and technical facilities. The network of material-technical and rear services bases must be complete, have good support capabilities, and be on an increasingly larger scale, in the process of the war. That network must provide supplies, replacement parts, and repairs for the armored forces on the spot and also for the mobile armored forces.

The creation of a network of depots, repair shops, and bases to supply equipment, parts, and fuel that is appropriate to mobile combat on the battlefields is a very urgent requirement which the armored troops must fulfill. That network must have a large stockpile of replacement parts and it must be decentralized and tightly managed, with unified standards and regulations regarding supplying and consumption, in order to facilitate supplying and repair. If the capabilities of each zone and locality are closely combined with the capabilities of the entire nation, a great capability will be created to provide material-technical support for the units and create the best conditions for the units on the battlefield to win the greatest possible victories.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADE AND AID

SRV PRESIDENT SENDS NATIONAL DAY GREETINGS

Finnish National Day

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 6 Dec 79 p 1

[Text] On 5 December 1979, SRV President Ton Duc Thang sent the following greetings message to President Urho Kekkonen of the Republic of Finland:

On the occasion of the 62d anniversary of the Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Finland, may I solemnly convey my warmest greetings to Your Excellency.

I wish Your Excellency continuous good health and the Finnish people happiness and prosperity.

I hope that the friendly relationships and cooperation between our two countries will be increasingly consolidated and developed.

Ivory Coast National Day

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 7 Dec 79 p 1

[Text] On 6 December 1979, SRV President Ton Duc Thang sent the following greetings message to President Felix Houphouet-Boigny of the Republic of the Ivory Coast:

On the occasion of the 19th National Day of the Republic of the Ivory Coast, on behalf of the Vietnamese people and the SRV Government and in my own name, may I convey my warm greetings to Your Excellency and through you to the government and people of the Republic of the Ivory Coast.

I wish the people of the Ivory Coast happiness.

I wish Your Excellency good health and present my high regards.

9332

CSO: 4209

ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

GOVERNMENT ACTION URGED AGAINST SIDEWALK PEDDLERS

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 4 Dec 79 p 3

[Article by Vo Thai, Quang Nam-Da Nang Province: "Let Us Immediately Correct These Deviations"]

[Text] We very happily welcome the resolution of the 6th Plenum of the Party Central Committee and the several new policies promulgated since then by the Council of Ministers. However, since they have been in effect and besides their positive aspects, which are fundamental in nature, a number of deviations have developed which the local government has not corrected.

For example, in the municipality of Da Nang, a number of persons, taking advantage of the new policies, instead of thinking about finding ways to produce many consumer goods and exports, have opened many coffee and beverage counters! This municipality has hundreds of beverage counters and coffee counters outfitted with gaudy lights and blaring music; instead of taking seats, the customers of these counters stand around creating a crowd. Together with coffee counters, various products whose circulation has been prohibited by the state, such as western medicines, tobacco, gasoline, oil and so forth have "burst onto the scene." As a result, Hung Vuong, Tran Phu and Phan Chu Trinh Streets, which were recently repaired and paved with cement, are lined with peddlers, so many peddlers that pedestrians are forced to walk in the gutter. A similar situation exists in a number of other cities.

The local government must take steps to stop this phenomenon.

7809

CSO: 4209

AGRICULTURE

NATIONWIDE CROP STATISTICS REPORTED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 11 Dec 79 p 1

[Article: "Northern Provinces Plant 300,000 Hectares of Winter Crops and Prepare for the 5th Month-Spring Season; Southern Provinces Complete 28 Percent of Their Plan on the Planting of Winter-Spring Crops; Work Continues on Combating Drought and Sowing Additional Seedlings"]

[Text] As of 5 December 1979, according to the Statistics General Department, the provinces and municipalities of the North had planted 307,000 hectares of vegetables and subsidiary food crops, including approximately 300,000 hectares of winter crops, thereby virtually completing their plan quota on the amount of area under cultivation. Deserving of attention is that the cultivation of sweet potatoes during this winter season has been increased by 46,000 hectares compared to last year. Generally speaking, a rather large amount of area has been put under the cultivation of winter crops compared to the plan; however, the quality of crops is poor because of the prolonged drought. The various localities are continuing to cultivate their vegetable and subsidiary food crops and making every effort to combat drought, inspect crops and prevent and control insects and diseases.

In conjunction with cultivating winter crops, the localities of the North have also urgently been making all the preparations needed for 5th month-spring production, including plowing fields, sowing additional seedlings, preparing additional livestock manure and propagating and sowing duckweed.

The districts in the North that are experiencing a prolonged drought have taken positive steps to overcome their difficulties by pumping and bailing water into fields and plowing and harrowing seedling fields in order to sow seedlings at the best time. Nearly 51,000 hectares are being used to raise seedlings; seedlings of 5th month rice variety 314 comprise 60.88 percent and seedlings of Nong Nghiep 8 comprise 20.5 percent of the total number of seedlings that have been sown, which are less than the percentages for the same period of time last year.

The seedlings that have been sown are only enough to transplant 32 percent of the area required under the plan. As a result, it is necessary to sow approximately 110,000 additional hectares of seedlings.

The seedlings that have been sown, although they are old, have grown slowly and are small due to the lack of water. Some 563,000 hectares have been plowed, which equal 52.3 percent of the planned quota. This year, the dry weather has permitted machines to be used in fields, consequently, the percentage of fields plowed by machines is rather high.

However, due to the prolonged dry, sunny weather, some land is too dry to be plowed (31,000 hectares in Thanh Hoa Province and more than 9,000 hectares in Vinh Phu Province).

Some 4.9 million tons of organic fertilizer have been prepared, which represents an increase compared to the same period of time last year. The various localities must continue to process and compost additional fertilizer in order to have enough fertilizer of all types for the 5th month-spring season. Ha Bac is building water conservancy projects in coordination with making 100,000 tons of additional fertilizer of all types, primarily mud fertilizer.

Due to the prolonged drought, the amount of area on which duckweed is being raised is less compared to last year. The provinces are continuing to plow and harrow fields in order to propagate additional duckweed.

The provinces and municipalities of the South are focusing their efforts on harvesting their 10th month rice crops. According to the Ministry of Agriculture, yields are relatively high. Farmers are now busily sowing winter-spring crops. To date, the provinces and municipalities of the South have completed 28 percent of their plan quota on the transplanting of winter-spring rice. In addition, they have planted 55,846 hectares of vegetables and subsidiary food crops, including 43,993 hectares of sweet potatoes and cassava, 6,852 hectares of vegetables and beans and 5,031 hectares of industrial crops.

7809

CSO: 4209

AGRICULTURE

PHU KHANH ACTS TO UPGRADE CO-OPS

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 10 Dec 79 p 1, 6

[VNA News Release: "Phu Khanh Province Strengthens Its Cooperatives"]

[Text] Phu Khanh Province has classified the 214 agricultural cooperatives within the province and intensified the effort to guide and strengthen deficient cooperatives.

In addition to the 12 excellent cooperatives and 30 good cooperatives that have recorded victories over the past three or four production seasons, have raised their income, have improved the life of their members and have fulfilled higher obligations to the state, the province still has 77 deficient cooperatives, the majority of which are newly established cooperatives.

The provincial agricultural transformation committee has conducted a review of the experiences of the excellent cooperatives of the province, especially the Hoa Binh 1 Cooperative in Tuy Hoa District and the Dien An Cooperative in Dien Khanh District, coordinated them with the advanced experiences of the Vu Thang and Dinh Cong Cooperatives to form the overall experience of the locality and guided the deficient cooperatives in applying these experiences. The districts of Tuy Hoa, Tuy An, Dien Khanh, Ninh Hoa, Cam Ranh and so forth have sent cadres from the excellent and good cooperatives to the deficient cooperatives, especially the cooperatives established at the start of 1979, to help these cooperatives gain experience in managing labor, regulating production and strengthening the mass organizations. During this winter-spring season, Tuy Hoa District, which is the key rice growing area of the province and was the first place in the province to complete the organization of agricultural cooperatives, has sent to each deficient cooperative two to four cadres from the advanced cooperatives, especially cadres on the management board, planning cadres, finance cadres, labor cadres and quota cadres, to help these cooperatives regulate their production. The district has also trained cooperative cadres in the new policies that have been adopted and sent key cadres in the district to the most deficient cooperatives in order to organize the

implementation of these new policies and, in this manner, strengthen these cooperatives and accelerate winter production and winter-spring production.

The districts of Dien Khanh, Cam Ranh and Van Ninh as well as Nha Trang City have promptly taken disciplinary action against and replaced a number of cooperative cadres who committed the shortcomings of engaging in misappropriation and intimidating the masses.

7809

CSO: 4209

AGRICULTURE

EFFORT MOUNTED TO FIGHT DROUGHT

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 9 Dec 79 p 1

[Article: "Localities Take Positive Steps To Combat Drought"]

[Text] As of the end of November, the northern provinces had completed the first phase in the dredging of important inlets and irrigation canals. Many farmland water conservancy systems, such as the northern Hung Hai system in Hai Hung, the Lien Son system in Vinh Phu Province, the Gia Thuan and Cau River systems in Ha Bac Province, the Chu River system in Thanh Hoa Province, the La Khe and Hong Van systems in Ha Son Binh Province, the Ap Bac system in Hanoi, the system of large electric pumps in northern Ha Nam Ninh Province, the north-south systems in Haiphong and Thai Binh and so forth, have been continuously supplying irrigation water for winter crops. The irrigation canals in which silt deposits recently became heavier than in previous years, such as the canals of the Dan Hoa pump station in Hanoi and the Cau Cat pump station in Hai Hung Province, were dredged by dredgers early. The corporation that manages the Hong Van farmland water conservancy system in Ha Son Binh Province has dredged 6,000 cubic meters of mud and sand deposits from the water intake opening of the pump station. A few other inlets are being dredged in order to promptly provide irrigation water at the start of December. Hai Hung, Ha Bac, Haiphong, Ha Nam Ninh, Quang Ninh, Ben Tre, Dong Nai, An Giang, Minh Hai, Cuu Long and other provinces have dredged and repaired farmland water conservancy projects, repaired electric and diesel pumps and constructed dams in order to impede the flow of salt water and combat drought in support of winter-spring production.

Each day, thousands of persons in Ninh Hai and An Son Districts in Thuan Hai Province and Don Duong District in Lam Dong Province are urgently repairing the Nha Trinh farmland water conservancy project system and the Don Duong reservoir, thereby taking positive steps to retain water and combat drought. Each day, more than 100,000 persons in the districts of Cu Chi, Thu Duc and Binh Chanh in Ho Chi Minh City, the districts of Cai Lay, Cai Be and Chau Thanh in Tien Giang Province, Tan Hiep District, An Bien District and Rach Gia City in Kien Giang Province, Ke Sach and Vinh Chau Districts in Hau Giang Province and Gia Rai District in Minh Hai

Province are building water conservancy projects to retain fresh water and combat drought and salt water in order to produce winter-spring crops. Tay Ninh Province has dug hundreds of wells to tap fresh underground water for subsidiary food crops and industrial crops; Long An Province is drilling wells to provide fresh water to the area of Duc Hoa Province that lacks fresh water. The electric pump stations of Giong Trom and Ba Tri in Ben Tre Province, Trung Hieu and Go Gang in Cuu Long Province, Binh Long, Loi Hoa, Binh Hoa and Phuoc Tan in Dong Nai Province, Vinh Trinh, Rach Ngoi and Quyet Thang in Hau Giang Province and so forth have been promptly inspected and repaired and are providing irrigation water. Haiphong and the provinces of Thai Binh, Bac Thai, Dong Nai, Long An and Ben Tre have trained workers in the operation and repair of diesel pumps in preparation for preventing and combating winter-spring drought. The localities have intensified the construction of water conservancy projects and prepared all of the means (including water wheels and buckets) needed to prevent and combat drought in support of production. The council that manages the inter-provincial northern Hung Hai farmland water conservancy system, the Nhue River system, the Cau River system, the Cau Son system, the Gia Thuan system, the Bac Duong system and so forth met to evaluate the difficult situation involving water sources at the start of this year's winter-spring season, discussed specific measures for tightly managing water sources and adopted a plan for regulating, distributing and economizing on water, thereby insuring adequate water for winter-spring production.

VNA News Release: by the end of November, the cooperatives in Ha Nam Ninh Province had plowed nearly 90,000 hectares of 5th month-spring fields, which represents a rate 2.5 times as fast as last year.

The districts of Nam Ninh and Hai Hau have nearly completed plowing all fields being put under 5th month-spring cultivation. The districts of Xuan Thuy, Hai Hau, Nam Ninh, Duy Tien and Ly Nhan have adopted a policy of providing additional subsidies for plowmen and have established workpoints suited to each type of labor; at the same time, they have mobilized children, teenagers and students to cut "buffalo" grass, consequently, plowing has been carried out many times faster than during the previous 5th month-spring season.

The various plowing units have been working overtime in order to achieve high productivity. In Ha Nam Ninh Province, more than 2,000 laborers in the plowing and harrowing teams have pledged to work overtime, work with high productivity and perform high quality work.

Because of the dry weather, this year, in contrast to other years, Ha Nam Ninh has guided the various cooperatives in efficiently deploying their labor and draft power in order to prepare fields early and expand the amount of area on which dry-land cultivation is practiced; at the same time, water has been stored in order to irrigate areas in which wet-land cultivation is practiced in an effort to avoid the need to raise crops half dry and half wet, which affects crop yields.

In Nghe Tinh Province, 338 cooperatives have agreed to raise 3,000 hectares of duckweed, 8 times more than the amount raised during the same period last year; Dien Chau District is raising 700 hectares and Do Luong and Yen Thanh Districts are raising 500 hectares apiece. As of 15 November, Ky Anh District had spread 1,050 hectares of duckweed, 4 times as much as last year.

Many midland districts are raising duckweed. The Youth Union and the agricultural sector have held classes to train youths and cooperative members in the techniques of raising duckweed.

The agricultural supply sector of Nghe Tinh Province has delivered potash fertilizer directly to cooperatives that are raising much duckweed.

7309

C30: 4209

AGRICULTURE

DROUGHT SITUATION REPORTED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 3 Dec 79 pp 1, 4

[VNA News Release: "The Present Water Conservancy, Hydrology and Agricultural Production Situation"]

[Text] According to the Ministry of Water Conservancy, this year's 10th month season has concluded early. There were only 40 millimeters of rain in the Red River Delta and former Zone 4 between 20 September and 20 November, which was 250 to 350 millimeters below the average for many years. The humidity dropped to an average of 30 to 40 percent, the lowest in the past 24 years. In October and during the first 20 days of November, 150 to 180 millimeters of moisture evaporated. There were 180 to 220 hours of sunlight, 60 to 80 hours more than the average for this period of time for many years and the highest number of hours of sunlight for this period of time in the past 24 years.

Along the Red River and the other rivers of the Red River Delta, there has been a serious shortage of rain since the end of September and the volume of water flowing in the Da River at Hoa Binh, the Thao River at Phu Tho and the Red River at Hanoi has been lower than it has been for many years, from 20.5 to 43 percent lower than normal and only slightly higher than the same period of time in 1962, a year of serious drought. The water levels in the river basins have declined rapidly.

In Hanoi, the water level of the Red River during the first 10 days of September was 7.13 meters, 2.21 meters higher than the average for many years. In October, the average was 5.8 meters, 0.39 meter lower than the average for many years. During these 20 days, the water level of the Red River at Hanoi declined 0.73 meter, an average of 35 millimeters per day, even though the Thac Ba water source was providing 180 to 250 cubic meters of water per second.

The Ma River and Lam River have normal water sources. Water continues to spill over the Bai Thuong and Do Luong dams.

Forecasts show that two possibilities exist regarding the level of the Red River at Hanoi in December 1979 and January 1980:

--If rainfall during December 1979 equals the average rainfall for many years and if the Thac Ba water source provides 100 to 150 cubic meters of water per second, the water level in December will still be lower than the average for many years and the water level in January 1980 will approximately equal the average for many years.

--If the rainfall in December is lower than the average for many years, the water level at Hanoi will decline and will decline even more in January 1980.

Tidewaters are in a low cycle during this winter-spring season in the Red River Delta. During December, there will be two periods of high tide-waters, from 4 to 10 December and from 18 to 25 December, with high tides ranging from 1.20 to 1.50 meters.

The water in the reservoirs in the Red River Delta and Thanh Hoa Province are below design capacity.

The water shortage described above makes it necessary for the provinces and municipalities of the North to resolve many problems in an effort to provide the water needed for winter production and 5th month-spring production.

It can be stated that many difficulties are faced with regard to water for winter-spring crops in the North. For nearly the entire winter season, there has been a serious, prolonged drought and the humidity has been the lowest in 24 years. Although this is not the driest period we have ever experienced, water sources have declined rapidly and if water is not used economically during the winter production season, there will surely be a shortage of water for the spring season. Farmland water conservancy projects must operate continuously and time is not available to repair or maintain these projects. If pump stations and farmland water conservancy systems are not utilized in an efficient manner, we will face many difficulties in the spring with regard to equipment for providing irrigation and bailing water, especially during the period of draining and plowing fields to be transplanted with spring rice. However, we must still guard against rain at the end of the winter season.

In spring, the water in the rivers and streams will be lower than the average for many years, the drought will be serious and, even if it does rain, it will still be a season marked by many difficulties with water. The areas that use tidewater must guard against the penetration of salt water. The water in reservoirs must be used in an efficient and economical manner.

To support winter production and 5th month-spring production well, the various districts and farmland water conservancy corporations must immediately formulate production plans and utilize the water within the district in a coordinated manner. Attention must be given to balancing the supply of water with the allocation of crops, the agricultural season, the nature of irrigation projects and regulations, etc. Diesel pumps, buckets and spinners must be deployed in a manner consistent with the production situation in each area, not thinly deployed on the basis of averages. All areas must continue to improve their farmland water conservancy systems, continue to build their fields and regulate and distribute water in a tightly managed manner consistent with the production plan and the situation surrounding water sources in order to thoroughly economize on water, electricity and diesel fuel. Full attention must be given to preparing rudimentary equipment and to organizing forces to combat the drought.

The Ministry of Water Conservancy has also suggested that the Ministry of Agriculture, on the basis of existing water sources and in view of the probable development of the situation over the next several months, establish an allocation of crops suited to each area and each locality; formulate planting and transplanting schedules and set forth water requirements for each type of dry-land and wet-land cultivation, for the direct sowing of new varieties and so forth; and insure that winter crops are harvested in a systematic manner and promptly deliver water to fields that are plowed dry in order to avoid the problem of "water waiting for fields" or the need to provide water over a large area, which will make it difficult to deliver water to fields. The Ministry of Water Conservancy has also suggested that the Ministries of Power, Engineering and Metals, Supply and so forth coordinate their activities in order to support agriculture well.

The people's committees of the various provinces and municipalities must closely guide the management and utilization of farmland water conservancy systems and organize a good movement to emulate the Cau Ghe farmland water conservancy group while deploying the forces needed to complete irrigation canals, ditches and sluices and build area embankments and plot embankments; they must take charge of managing the distribution of electricity, strengthen the activities of the various farmland water conservancy corporations, stations and groups, put diesel pumps under the management of the water conservancy sector and closely guide the effort to protect projects.

AGRICULTURE

RICE YIELD EXCEEDS EXPECTATIONS IN RED RIVER DELTA

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 4 Dec 79 p 1

[Article: "The Northern Provinces Harvest 90.6 Percent of Their 10th Month Rice, with Many Localities Recording Rather High Yields, and Plant Nearly 260,000 Hectares of Winter Crops; the Southern Provinces Begin To Harvest Their Crops with Rather High Rice Yields; the Drought, Which Is Expanding, Is Being Overcome"]

[Text] The weather has been dry since the start of the harvest and this has been favorable for the harvesting of 10th month rice. As of 25 November, according to the Statistics General Department, the provinces and municipalities of the North had harvested 1,137,000 hectares, 90.6 percent of the land under the cultivation of rice (by the same time last year, 884,000 hectares had been harvested).

The lowland and midland provinces and Thanh Hoa Province have virtually finished their harvests. On the fields that have been harvested, the 10th month rice yields of the Red River Delta provinces and Thanh Hoa Province have been higher than initially projected. Over the past 10 days, the dry weather continued. Cooperatives have done everything possible to bail water so that they can plow and harrow their fields and continue to plant vegetables and subsidiary food crops. Since the start of the season, 295,000 hectares have been planted, including 260,000 hectares of winter crops, 78.3 percent of the plan quota. This year, of the various winter crops, 100,699 hectares of sweet potatoes have been planted, 7.6 percent more than planned. Some 48,410 hectares have been planted with vegetables, 75.6 percent of the plan quota, and 88,558 hectares have been planted with western potatoes, 73.7 percent of the plan quota. The localities are overcoming every difficulty and endeavoring to plant the remaining western potatoes required under the plan. Thanh Hoa Province has exceeded its plan quota on the planting of western potatoes by 34.2 percent. Hai Hung Province has completed 87.2 percent of its plan, Vinh Phu has completed 82 percent and Hanoi has completed 80.7 percent. Due to the continued cold, dry weather, cooperatives have continued to bail and carry irrigation water to crops that have been planted. A number of winter crops are growing

slowly due to the dry weather. In scattered cases, corn and sweet potatoes have died, beans have withered and so forth.

Together with harvesting 10th month rice and planting and cultivating winter crops, the provinces and municipalities of the North are making every preparation for the 5th month-spring season. Fifth month seedlings are short, the seedling bunches are small and these seedlings will be lost if transplanted. The localities must guard against a shortage of 5th month seedlings, especially seedlings transplanted in lowlying fields. To date, 32,783 hectares of seedlings have been sown (9,749 hectares less than the same time last year); variety 314 constitutes 59.4 percent of the seedlings planted by nine provinces.

Generally speaking, there is no shortage of spring rice varieties in the various provinces; however, deserving of concern is the fact that the germination rate of spring paddy at a number of places is very low, only 60-70 percent. The localities must focus their efforts on guiding the preparation of fields well by making full use of track-mounted tractors for plowing. They must closely guide the sowing of Nong Nghiep 8 seedlings, insuring that they are sown at the proper time, that is, during the first days of December, sown primarily in seed beds and must protect them against the cold and cultivate them thoroughly. Fifth month seedlings must be irrigated by bailing and fertilized with decomposed livestock manure so that they become large and are not lost when transplanted.

Some 4,424 tons of organic fertilizer have been prepared; however, half of this has been applied to winter crops. Compared to the same period of time last year, less duckweed has been sown. The localities must plow and harrow their 5th month fields so that duckweed can be sown over a large area. The drought is showing signs of spreading; positive steps must be taken to prevent and combat drought of winter crops and cultivate 5th month-spring rice.

The 10th month rice crops of the southern provinces (from Lam Dong southward) are growing well. The amount of area affected by insects and diseases has declined significantly compared to last year. As of 25 November, the provinces had harvested 151,000 hectares of early 10th month rice, 9.4 percent of the area transplanted with rice. Nghia Binh Province has harvested 74 percent of the area transplanted with rice, Quang Nam-Da Nang has harvested 49.7 percent, Ben Tre has harvested 44.6 percent and so forth. In addition, the provinces from Lam Dong southward have transplanted 121,000 hectares of winter-spring rice and sown 35,000 hectares of vegetables, subsidiary food crops and industrial crops.

AGRICULTURE

EDITORIAL ADVOCATES EVENNESS IN INTENSIVE CULTIVATION, PRODUCTIVITY

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 7 Dec 79 p 1

[Editorial: "Evenly Heighten the Rate of Intensive Rice Cultivations"]

[Text] Intensive cultivation is a basic guideline for socialist agriculture. Implementation of this guideline means a rational increase in the investment of production means and labor with the aim of making each area unit greatly increase its yield of products at a low production cost.

There is a correlation between intensive cultivation and soil fertility. While the area of fields and lands is limited, their productive power is not. Production realities have demonstrated that, with increasingly better production conditions, man can transform bad soil into good soil and continuously increase soil fertility.

Generally speaking, rice productivity in many provinces has tended to decrease over the past few years. It must be noted that fairly great discrepancies exist among various localities concerning the degree of intensive cultivation and rice productivity. In Ha Nam Ninh, the rice yield varies greatly with each region in the province, each district in a region, each village in a district and each of the fields belonging to a cooperative. This inequality is first caused by different natural conditions. However, soil fertility depends also on the degree of intensive cultivation and organizational and implementation abilities. In Hai Hau, Xuan Thuy, Binh Luc and other districts, rice output has increased not because of the natural soil fertility or the situation of the fields but as a result of the degree of intensive cultivation carried out on each farming area unit. Any change in the additional volume of production by an area unit is ultimately and decisively brought about by the implementation of intensive cultivation measures and by the way management is organized.

Low-productivity cooperatives are generally situated in areas where most fields are high while cooperatives which possess large rice cultivated areas usually transplant seedlings at large intervals and belatedly, use a small quantity of fertilizers, mix up different varieties of rice and fail to properly tend the crop. Concentrating effort on increasing rice productivity where it is still low and obtaining more evenness of the fields' productivity must become a trend to exploit the immense potentials of agriculture, to raise the people's living standards and to increase

contributions to the state. A number of districts in Ha Nam Ninh Province have begun to give attention to consolidating weak installations, to properly assign the contingent of core cadres, to develop the masses' right to collective ownership, to focus on water conservancy and fertilization, to select new strains and to create conditions for rapidly increasing the production of commodities with a view to increasing the gross output of the province.

District leadership has a direct effect on the process of eliminating great discrepancies in rice productivity among various regions. If equal yields are obtained by cooperatives, each district will be able to produce tens of thousands more of paddy each year. A task of prime importance is to accurately assess the land potentials and to closely associate the building of material-technical bases with the harmonious implementation of the movement to reorganize production and improve management from the grassroots level and coordinate it with the implementation of certain new state policies, the improvement of managerial organization within cooperatives and the rapid application of confirmed technical progresses in production. It is necessary to better recapitulate and broaden the emulation movement which has produced progressive typical models. The assistance to be rendered by both the central and provincial levels in zoning specialized cultivation areas, strengthening material-technical bases, training cadres and applying scientific achievements is also an important measure aimed at further enabling each district to obtain a rice productivity equal to that of other localities.

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AGRICULTURE

AGRICULTURAL SITUATION IN BAC THAI, QUANG NAM-DANANG, DONG NAI

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 7 Dec 79 p 1

[Text] In Bac Thai, as of 25 November, cooperatives had not yet sown the 5-month rice seeds on the remaining 10 percent of the planned area. A number of seed fields suffered from drought and seedlings died consequently. In areas where seeds were sown early, seedlings grew old and began to put forth branches. Cooperatives inspected the seeds sown, organized labor to fight drought and helped one another sow an additional amount of 5-month rice seeds and sow spring rice seeds according to schedule. Phu Binh and Pho Yen districts urged riverside cooperatives to sow seeds for the benefit of localities seriously affected by drought. Collectivized peasants belonging to many cooperatives in Pho Yen districts actively fought drought and saved 65 hectares. By using lake and pond water, the Trung Thanh, Tan Huong and Duc Son cooperatives successfully sowed seeds on a further 20 hectares.

Bach Thong, Dinh Hoa, Dai Tu, Cho Don and Na Ri districts managed to sow seeds on lands which were low, near streams and protected from strong winds; these lands represented 20 to 30 percent of the planned area.

Cooperatives which lacked 5-month rice seeds sowed seeds of the "Nong Nghiep 8" and "Nong Nghiep 22" varieties to cultivate the spring rice crop. In the last 5 days of November, peasants in Quang Nam-Danang carried out dry plowing on a further 12,000 hectares, raising the area which was plowed from the beginning of the winter-spring season to 30 November to 28,000 hectares representing 50 percent of the plan norm.

Hoa Vang, Duy Xuyen, Dien Ban and Hoi An districts have fulfilled 75 to 91 percent of the planned area [for plowing].

Based on the seasonal schedule, almost all installations have entrusted plowing to labor groups which have fully used mechanical power and buffaloes and oxen in this task. After concluding that if they waited for the available machines and buffaloes, plowing would be delayed and would affect the sowing and cultivation schedule, cooperative members and peasants in a number of areas have unanimously set up field hoeing teams.

Dong Hai has set up a committee to guide the winter-spring production, coordinated agricultural transformation with production intensification on the district scale and mobilized the combined strength of various sectors to promote agriculture and to try to sow and grow rice, subsidiary food crops and industrial crops on 35,000 hectares.

Activity coordination committees of the agricultural, water conservancy, material supply and agricultural machine sectors, the peasants' association, the department for the transformation of agriculture and other industrial sectors and mass organizations have visited districts to inspect the cultivated area, water sources, manpower, supplies and equipment and to guide district draw up appropriate production plans. Based on the fact that areas for specialized cultivation have been zoned, districts have divided themselves into small areas and drawn up a production schedule for each village, selected important areas for the cultivation of rice, subsidiary food crops and industrial crops, made intensive investments and modified the planned allocation of rice varieties in accordance with different categories of fields in the province. Based on the production plan of each district, the various sectors in the province have worked out plans to promote agriculture, signed contracts and specifically assigned tasks and responsibilities.

The department for the transformation of agriculture has organized advanced professional training for cadres in production collectives, consolidated these collectives, rapidly corrected shortcomings committed in the recent past, educated and motivated peasants to voluntarily participate in collective production and to simultaneously build good collectives, develop production and create conditions for building material-technical bases and applying technical progress in production.

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HEAVY INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION

BRIEFS

'NHAN DAN' OFFICE--On the afternoon of 10 December, work began on pouring the foundation for the construction of the NHAN DAN editorial office and printing plant in Phuong Liet Ward in Hanoi. This is a major project being constructed by us with the help of the USSR. The Phuong Liet Lake area, which measures more than 8 hectares, has begun to be filled in with dirt. This dirt is being transported by train, which enables much to be transported at one time and saves much fuel. The Giap Bat Railroad Station has been assembling suitable trains and rapidly clearing routes and unloading railroad cars. Project units number 604 and 608 of Railroad Corporation Number 6 will work three shifts, thereby insuring that 60 railroad cars will be used each day to transport dirt; this number will be increased at a later date. The workers of the mechanized unit of Railroad Corporation Number 6 are excavating and loading dirt onto railroad cars by machines, thereby increasing the rate at which the lake is filled in and the project's foundation is constructed. Yesterday afternoon, 10 railroad cars dropped the first 300 tons of dirt into Phuong Liet Lake.

[Text] [Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 11 Dec 79 p 4] 7809

CSO: 4209

LIGHT INDUSTRY

EDITORIAL CITES NEED FOR CONSUMER REPAIR SERVICES

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 11 Dec 79 p 1

[Editorial: "Efficiently Organizing the Repair and Service Network"]

[Text] The development of the material and cultural lives of the people is causing the demand for repair work and services to constantly increase, especially in the municipalities, cities and towns. Every family and person has need of ordinary housing, electrical and plumbing repair work as well as the repair of such consumer goods as clothing, sandals, hats, tables, chairs, cabinets, beds, watches, bicycles, electric fans and so forth. A number of families also require the repair of sewing machines, refrigerators, radios and televisions or require such services as laundering, the rental of furniture and ornaments, etc. It is the desire of everyone to have broken articles repaired as close and quickly as possible and, if these articles can be repaired within the home, so much the better. Our repair and service network does not fulfill this desire. Generally speaking, repair work performed at state-operated installations is more reliable and more reasonably priced; however, customers have to wait too long for repair work to be completed, procedures are so complicated as to anger customers and service personnel are not polite. With regard to repair work performed at private installations, the reverse is true: repair work is more convenient but the price is frequently very high. The repair of consumer goods of high value, such as radios, televisions and watches, is frequently not as reliable as it could be. The repair of housing is very complicated because very many problems still exist with regard to organization and support.

Organizing the repair and service network well has become a universal requirement of life. The resolution of the 6th Plenum of the Party Central Committee established this as one of the sectors in the structure of local industry within the provinces and municipalities and within the scope of the district. The repair and service network of a locality must be developed in a manner consistent with the specific requirements of the locality and can consist of many sectors, many trades, many types of

services and many different forms of organization: state-operated, collective and private. It is necessary to make efficient use of the various segments of the economy and of suitable forms of organization. We need not use all three forms of organization for each type of repair work or service. Generally speaking, state-operated installations should only undertake repair work and services for a number of major needs at places where the population is high; in addition, repair cooperatives and teams and private handicraftsmen should be utilized so that repair work and services can be provided on each street, in each hamlet, at each agency and for each family in a timely and convenient manner. Repair work and services can be provided by many sectors working together, for example, the building sector can take charge of repairing houses and performing electrical and plumbing repair work, the industrial and artisan sectors can repair consumer goods and cultural products and the commerce sector can organize other repair and service stores. The industrial services have the task of helping the local people's committees manage this work.

Repair work can only be performed well when there is an ample supply of spare parts. As a result, production plans must contain norms on the production of a suitable supply of spare parts and production installations have the task of completing these norms just as they complete the norms on their finished products. In business, it is important to create the conditions for customers to buy the exact product they need instead of having to buy a complete set, for example, they should be able to buy a peddle, a brake, a spoke and so forth without having to buy a pair or a complete set.

The production and widespread sale of repair tools and implements will help many persons to repair their own articles. Another form of significant benefit is to open many stores that buy and sell used products, stores at which commerce agencies buy used, broken products, repair them, restore their use value and then resell them to consumers.

Repair work and services are activities that are closely linked to production and everyday life. Through these activities, the life of products is lengthened, working people save both time and money and society consumes fewer supplies. Organizing and managing the repair and service network well are as important as organizing a part of the production apparatus well.

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